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"True threats" encompass those statements where the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group
of individuals. The speaker need not actually intend to carry out
the threat.
-Justice O'Connor's opinion of the Court in Virginia v. Black1
INTRODUCTION: WADING THROUGH MUDDIED WATERS

S

OME Supreme Court decisions clarify a murky area of the law.
Others further muddy an area in need of clarification. Unfortunately, the Court's decision in Virginia v. Black has proven to be
another instance of the latter. For the first time, the Court in Black
defined the term "true threat"; 2 however, in providing a definition,
the Court created more confusion than elucidation. Instead of
clearly articulating the contours of what constitutes a "true threat,"
the Court's definition (and opinion) spawned as many questions as
answers. 3 One critical question the Court's ambiguous language
failed to answer is what intent, if any, the government must prove a
speaker had in order for his communication to qualify as a "true
threat" and, thus, unprotected speech. Put another way, what is the
required mens rea for threatening speech to be constitutionally
criminalized? A brief comparison of two recent (post-Black) lower
court opinions demonstrates the uncertainty underlying this specific area of "true threats" jurisprudence.
In United States v. Bly,4 a federal district court refused to dismiss
an indictment against a defendant charged with, inter alia, mailing
a threatening communication in violation of federal law. 5 The court
1

538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003) (internal citations omitted).
See id. and accompanying text.
3
See Steven G. Gey, A Few Questions About Cross Burning, Intimidation, and
Free Speech, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1287, 1290 (2005) ("The mark of a badly written
opinion is that the reader has more questions about the state of the law after reading
the opinion than before. By that measure Justice O'Connor's Black opinion is very
badly written.") [hereinafter Gey, A Few Questions].
4
No. CRIM. 3:04CR00011, 2005 WL 2621996 (W.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2005).
5
18 U.S.C. § 876 (2000) ("Whoever knowingly so deposits or causes to be delivered
as aforesaid [in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, to be sent or
delivered by the Postal Service or knowingly causes to be delivered by the Postal Service according to the direction thereon], any communication with or without a name
or designating mark subscribed thereto, addressed to any other person and containing
2
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held that to meet its burden, the government did not need to "allege an intent to intimidate."6 For the defendant's letter to constitute a "true threat," and thus fall outside the ambit of First
Amendment protection, the government only needed to prove that
"'an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context
of [the] letter would interpret it as a threat of injury. "' 1 Whether
the defendant intended for the communication to be threatening
was immaterial. Conversely, in United States v. Magleby (decided
only two months prior to Bly), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit posited that true threats "must be made 'with
the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death. "'8
According to this court, absent the speaker's intent to threaten, the
communication could not constitute a "true threat" and was therefore constitutionally protected under the First Amendment.
Such disparate conceptions have significant consequences: a
communication considered a "true threat" in one jurisdiction may
be deemed protected speech in another. While this doctrinal split is
important in its own right, perhaps more significant is that each
court relied on the same source as justification for its approachthe Black Court's aforementioned definition of "true threats." Notably, both courts in Bly and Magleby claimed their respective interpretations of Black as the legal high ground. 9
A main purpose of this Note is to explain why (and how) lower
courts, such as the two discussed above, have taken various approaches-based on their different interpretations of Black-to the
intent standard of the "true threats" doctrine. Consequently, the
impact of Black on the true threats jurisprudence will be explored.
More generally, this Note will focus on the role of intent in defining "true threats." It will examine the various intent standards that
any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of the addressee or
of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.").
6
Bly, 2005 WL 2621996, at *2.
7
Id. (quoting United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973)).
8
420 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 360).
'The district court in Bly, which held that the speaker does not need to have the intent to threaten for his words to constitute a "true threat," stated that "Black could
not be clearer on this point." 2005 WL 2621996, at *2. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in
Magleby, which held that the speaker does need to have the intent to threaten for his
words to constitute a "true threat," directly quoted and cited the definition provided
in Black when outlining its own interpretation of "true threats." 420 F.3d at 1139.
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have been proposed and how courts have treated them. By analyzing the jurisprudence from both a pre- and post-Black perspective,
this Note hopes to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of
the issue of intent, and its disputed place in the "true threats" doctrine, than has been achieved in earlier (albeit limited) scholarship.10
Because the focus of this Note is on the issue of intent, other unresolved matters related to the true threats doctrine will not be discussed. For instance, the degree of immediacy 11 or specificity12 re10

While the area of "true threats" has received relatively little attention, the most
incisive articles examining the doctrine and its various intent standards were written
before Black was decided. See, e.g., G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats,
Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. Rev.
829, 937-1010 (providing an impressive compilation of each circuit's approach to
"true threats"); Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment Value
of Threats, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 541, 565-98 (2000) [hereinafter Gey, Nuremberg Files];
Jordan Strauss, Context is Everything: Towards a More Flexible Rule for Evaluating
True Threats Under the First Amendment, 32 Sw. U. L. Rev. 231 (2003).
Articles written after Black either give cursory treatment to the issue of intent or
focus on other topics, such as the Court's language concerning intimidation or its
holding on the legality of cross-burning. See, e.g., Gey, A Few Questions, supra note
3, at 1325-56; Roger C. Hartley, Cross Burning-Hate Speech as Free Speech: A
Comment on Virginia v. Black, 54 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1 (2004); W. Wat Hopkins, Cross
Burning Revisited: What the Supreme Court Should Have Done in Virginia v. Black
and Why It Didn't, 26 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 269 (2004).
Interestingly, most of the articles written after Black are more concerned with the
ramifications of the Ninth Circuit's 2002 en bane decision in Planned Parenthood of
the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058
(9th Cir. 2002), than the Supreme Court's 2003 Black opinion. See, e.g., Jennifer
Elrod, Expressive Activity, True Threats, and the First Amendment, 36 Conn. L. Rev.
541, 544, 585-608 (2004); Matthew G.T. Martin, Comment, True Threats, Militant Activists, and the First Amendment, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 280, 297-325 (2003); Lori Weiss,
Note, Is the True Threats Doctrine Threatening the First Amendment? Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists Signals the Need to Remedy an Inadequate Doctrine, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1283 (2004).
11
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1105-07 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (explaining that she "would not include the imminence or immediacy of the threatened
action as a prerequisite to finding a true threat"); United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp.
1375, 1385-86 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (discussing an immediacy requirement for the communication to constitute a true threat); State v. DeLoreto, 827 A.2d 671, 682 (Conn.
2003) (citing Black for the proposition that "[i]mminence, however, is not a requirement under the true threats doctrine").
"See, e.g., United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1492 (1st Cir. 1997) ("The use of
ambiguous language does not preclude a statement from being a threat."); United
States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994) ("An absence of explicitly threatening
language does not preclude the finding of a threat .... "); United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1281-84 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (discussing whether a website
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quired for the communication to constitute a true threat will not be
addressed. Other issues regarding the actus reus of a "true threat,"
such as defining what constitutes a truly threatening statement,
also fall outside the scope of this Note. Similarly, the area of electronic threats, an emerging subset of the "true threats" jurisprudence, will be dealt with only where it raises a pertinent intent issue.13 This Note is focused on one question: what is the minimum
mens rea required for threatening speech to be constitutionally
prohibited?
This Note will proceed in five Parts. Part I will serve as a short
introduction to the category of true threats and its place within
First Amendment jurisprudence. Part II will examine the history of
true threats and intent leading up to Virginia v. Black, highlighting
the foundational opinion of Watts v. United States and the various
intent approaches that became available in its wake. Part III will
discuss the potential interpretations of the language in Black, and
Part IV will explain how lower courts have treated the Court's
definition of true threats in Black. Finally, Part V will address the
normative arguments for each intent approach and suggest which
standard the Court should adopt.
I. PUNISHING PURE SPEECH:
THE PROSCRIPTION OF TRUE THREATS

Whenever pure speech is regulated, it must be done with caution
and precision. 14 As the Court correctly explained in its first true
threats case, Watts v. United States, "a statute . . . which makes
criminal a form of pure speech[) must be interpreted with the
commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind. What is a
that lacks any explicitly threatening language constitutes a true threat); Baker, 890 F.
Supp. at 1386, 1388-90 (analyzing the degree of specificity required for the communication to constitute a true threat).
For an influential opinion which addresses both the issues of immediacy and specificity, see United States v. Ketner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976). Despite its relatively
important contribution to the true threats jurisprudence more generally, the Ketner
decision will receive scarce attention here because of its minimal discussion of intent.
13
See, e.g., infra Section 11.E. (discussing the Ninth Circuit's 2002 Planned Parenthood decision).
14
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) ('"precision of
regulation' is demanded" in the "context of constitutionally protected activity")
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371U.S.415, 438 (1963)).
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threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech." 15 Nevertheless, pure speech can be punished in a
manner consistent with the First Amendment. In Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, the Court reiterated that free speech is not absolute: "[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem." 16 Such classes
of speech include libel, obscenity, and fighting words-"those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. " 11 Although the Court in Chaplinsky
did not refer to true threats in its list of exemplary categories, it
later recognized threats as another exception in Watts. There, the
Court held that, like libel and obscenity, true threats may be punished without violating the First Amendment. 18
Even though Watts does not cite Chaplinksy, the classification of
true threats as unprotected speech is clearly congruent with the latter's rationale of regulating expression that by its "very utterance
inflict[s] injury." 19 According to the Court in Black, "a prohibition
on true threats 'protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence' and
'from the disruption that fear engenders,' in addition to protecting
people 'from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur. "' 20 Instead of conveying a fact, idea, or opinion, a true threat
causes fear, disruption, and a risk of violence. 21 Its contribution to
public debate and to the marketplace of ideas, the core values of
15

394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam).
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 {1942); see also Black, 538 U.S. at 358 {"The protections afforded by the First Amendment, however, are not absolute, and we have long recognized that the government may regulate certain categories of expression consistent
with the Constitution.") (citing Chaplinsky).
17
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
18
Watts, 394 U.S. at 707 {holding that a statute which punishes threatening speech is
constitutional on its face).
19
Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 572. The Court in Watts did not explicitly treat true
threats as a categorical exception to the First Amendment, as the Court in Chaplinsky
had treated libel and obscenity. However, subsequent cases made clear that Watts
stands for the proposition that true threats are a categorical exception to the First
Amendment. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
20
Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (alteration in original) (quoting R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388).
21
See United States v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The threat alone is
disruptive of the recipient's sense of personal safety and well-being and is the true
gravamen of the offense.") (quoting United States v. Manning, 923 F.2d 83, 86 (8th
Cir.1991)).
16
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the First Amendment, is de minimis. As Professor Steven Gey suggests, a true threat falls "outside the scope of First Amendment
protection because it operates more like a physical action than a
verbal or symbolic communication of ideas or emotions. " 22 In addition to the personal costs associated with fear and disruption, true
threats are responsible for the social costs of investigating and preventing potential violence. 23 This is most apparent when threats are
directed at government officials and other public figures. Like the
other classes of punishable speech, true threats serve "no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." 24
While the reasons for proscribing true threats may be agreed
upon, attempts at defining the scope of this First Amendment exception, and determining a proper intent standard, have proven
more elusive. Unlike the Chaplinsky triumvirate of libel, 25 obscenity,26 and fighting words, 21 the category of true threats suffers from
22

Gey, Nuremberg Files, supra note 10, at 593; see also State v. DeLoreto, 827 A.2d
671, 680 (Conn. 2003) ("It is not plausible to uphold the right to use words as projectiles where no exchange of views is involved.") (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
23
Elrod, supra note 10, at 547-48 ("As proscribable acts, true threats have a number
of detrimental impacts on society ... [including] the cost of protecting against, reducin~, preventing, or eliminating the threatened violence.").
4
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
25
Although complex (perhaps unnecessarily so), the constitutional law of libel, and
the legal standards and tests associated with it, have been clearly defined. See generally N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defining libel law for public officials
and introducing the "actual malice" test); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974) (defining libel law for public figures); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (defining libel law for non-public figures).
26
See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (limiting regulation of
obscene material to works depicting or describing sexual conduct and "which, taken
as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value"); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding
that child pornography is unprotected speech under the First Amendment).
27
See generally Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574 (holding that words which are "likely to
provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace"
are not protected speech); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) ("This Court
has also held that the States are free to ban ... so-called 'fighting words,' those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.") (citing
Chaplinsky ).
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the lack of a clearly discernable definition. Part of the problem can
be attributed to the relatively few times the Supreme Court has
squarely addressed the issue (only twice-in Watts and in Black).
Moreover, when the Court has confronted the meaning of true
threats, it has done so ambiguously. As a result, especially when it
comes to the issue of intent, the true threats jurisprudence as it currently stands does not represent, in the words of Chaplinksy, a
"well-defined and narrowly limited class[) of speech." 28 Explaining
how that happened is where this Note now turns.
II. DEVELOPING AN INTENT STANDARD: THE ROAD TO BLACK

A. The First Step: Watts v. United States
The Court first addressed the subject of true threats in Watts;
however, it had little to offer when it came to the issue of intent.
Robert Watts was convicted for violating a federal statute that
prohibited "knowingly and willfully" making a threat "to take the
life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United
States." 29 In 1966, during a political debate at a public rally, Watts
made the following statement regarding the receipt of his draft
classification: "I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle
the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J. " 30 In a short per curiam opinion, the Court held that "the statute initially requires the
Government to prove a true 'threat. "' 31 Because the Court did not
28

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571.
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 705 (1969). The federal statute under which
Watts was prosecuted, still in force today in almost identical form, was 18 U.S.C.
§ 871(a) (1964). Because most circuit court opinions that address the issue of intent
for true threats tend to be about threats against the President, most of the opinions
and decisions considered in this Note are based on prosecutions under Section 871.
However, because nearly every circuit (correctly, in the eyes of this author) applies
the same intent standard for true threats, regardless of the alleged target, see infra
note 75, this Note will treat cases involving threats against the President the same as,
and interchangeably with, cases involving threats against private persons. Thus, this
Note will specify that a case discussed involves a threat against the President only
when such a fact seems particularly pertinent or interesting.
30
Watts, 394 U.S. at 706.
31
Id. at 708. This was the first time the Court had ever used the term "true threat."
It most likely included the adjective "true" in order to distinguish threats that were
not protected by the First Amendment from those threatening statements that were,
such as Watts's "political hyperbole." The addition of such an adjective to distinguish
similar concepts is common in the legal lexicon. The best example is perhaps the term
29
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"believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by [Watts]
fits within that statutory term," it reversed the conviction. 32 The
Court relied on three factors, which this Note will call the "Watts
factors," in holding that Watts's statement was not a true threat:
the statement (1) was made during a political debate, (2) was expressly conditional in nature, and (3) caused the listeners to laugh.33
In addition to establishing a true threats exception, the lasting significance of Watts, at least when applied by future courts, has been
the relevance of these three Watts factors. 34
The Court in Watts had precious little to say on the issue of intent. In a brief discussion of the statute's use of the term "willfulness," the Court noted that the majority of the D.C. Circuit subscribed to the view, first espoused in Ragansky v. United States,
that the willfulness requirement was met if "the speaker voluntarily
uttered the charged words with 'an apparent determination to
carry them into execution."' 35 Skeptical of such an interpretation,
the Court made the following observation: "[p]erhaps this interpretation is correct, although we have grave doubts about it."36 Nevertheless, because the Court found Watts's speech to fall outside the
scope of true threats, it reasoned that it need not conclusively decide the intent issue. 37 It is important to point out that the Court's
"actual notice," commonly used in property and procedure law. "Actual notice" is the
same thing as "notice" (just as "true threats" are "threats"), but the adjective, "actual," is included to distinguish "actual notice" from "constructive notice." Similarly,
"true" threats are distinguished from those threats which constitute protected speech.
32 Id.
33
Id. at 707-08.
34
See Strauss, supra note 10, at 242-43; see also, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 865
F.2d 83, 85 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying the Watts factors in affirming the defendant's
conviction).
35
Watts, 394 U.S. at 707-08 (quoting Ragansky v. United States, 253 F. 643, 645 (7th
Cir. 1918)) (emphasis omitted).
36
Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (citing Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 686-93 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., dissenting) (rejecting the Ragansky approach and arguing that
the government should have to prove that the defendant intended to carry out the
threat)).
"There are several plausible explanations (or, more appropriately, speculations) as
to why the Court addressed the meaning of true threats and the issue of intent in such
an imprecise manner. The Court was closely divided, with three justices dissenting
and one justice who would have denied the petition for certiorari. Watts, 394 U.S. at
708, 712. As noted above, the Court announced its decision in a short per curiam
opinion. Perhaps the Court wrote per curiam because the majority could not agree on
a rationale and, thus, could not provide a more detailed explanation for its judgment.
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analysis throughout the opinion seems more concerned with statutory construction than with constitutional interpretation. Nevertheless, on the issue of intent, it was first down and the Court punted.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, until Black, usually addressed true threats tangentially and typically had nothing to say
regarding the issue of intent. 38 As one commentator put it, writing
on the eve of Black, "[f]or the Supreme Court, threat speech
started, and apparently ended, with Watts v. United States." 39 Consequently, lower courts, left with little guidance, blindly searched
for an answer to the following question: what mens rea, if any,
must a speaker have for his communication to constitute a true
threat?

Possible evidence of this is Justice Douglas's concurring opinion, in which no other
justice joined, that focuses on the history of laws prohibiting threats against a country's leader. Id. at 709. Additionally, Watts was decided only a few years after the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. With such a
delicate history serving as the backdrop, perhaps the Court simply wanted to reach its
decision as narrowly as possible without limiting the scope of the statute any more
than necessary. Whatever the explanation for the Court's terse treatment of the issue,
the opinion failed to provide any concrete guidance.
38
In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), the Court dealt with
threatening speech but in the context of incitement. Relying on its incitement doctrine, the Court held that a speaker who threatened violence against boycott breakers
could not be held liable for merchant losses because his speech did not incite imminent, lawless action (and thus was protected). Id. at 925-29. The Court also noted that
the speaker's "'threats' of vilification or social ostracism ... [were] constitutionally
protected." Id. at 926.
In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992), the Court was bound by the
Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute at issue as prohibiting only
fighting words (and not true threats). However, the Court did refer to the "true
threats" exception as an example of what could constitute permissible viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 388. The Court explained that Congress could "criminalize only
those threats of violence that are directed against the President" because "the reasons
why threats of violence are outside the First Amendment ... have special force when
applied to the person of the President." Id. (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 707, and 18
U.S.C. § 871 (1964)). Additionally, the R.A. V. decision was the first time the Court
provided a specific set of reasons why true threats may be regulated. See supra note
20 and accompanying text. But, alas, the Court did not address the issue of intent.
Finally, in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994), the
Court merely reiterated that threats, "however communicated, are proscribable under
the First Amendment."
39
Strauss, supra note 10, at 242.
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B. Available Approaches: Objective and Subjective Standards
and Why the Difference Matters
Before examining how lower courts after Watts addressed the issue of intent, it may be helpful to introduce the main approaches
and explain why the differences between them are significant. The
available standards generally fall into one of two categories: an objective test or a subjective test. An objecti'.;e test de~nes a true
threat as a communication that a reasonable person would find
threatening. The test typically comes in one of three forms. The
variations are based on whether the perspective of the test is that
of a reasonable speaker, a reasonable listener, or a "neutral" reasonable person. 40
All objective tests require one general intent element-the defendant must have knowingly made the statement. Therefore, the
government must prove that the "statement was not the result of
mistake, duress, or coercion." 41 For example, "a foreigner, ignorant
of the English language, repeating these same words without
knowledge of their meaning, may not knowingly have made a
threat." 42 Similarly, if the speaker involuntarily made the statement, it would not pass the objective test. This is the only general
intent element required by all forms of the objective test. As will
be discussed below, the reasonable speaker test includes an additional general intent element.
Conversely, a subjective test requires the government to prove
one general intent element and one specific intent element before
the communication is considered unprotected speech. The subjec40

See Blakey & Murray, supra note 10, at 937-1002; Strauss, supra note 10, at 24756. The aforementioned Bly opinion is an example of a reasonable listener objective
test. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
41
United States v. Hart, 457 F.2d 1087, 1091 (10th Cir. 1972) (emphasis omitted).
42
Ragansky v. United States, 253 F. 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1918). The court in United
States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 558 (3d Cir. 1991), provided two examples of how
someone could make a threat unknowingly. First, if "a non-English speaker ... unwittingly reads aloud a threatening statement in English, which he does not know to be a
threat," he would not have knowingly made a true threat. Similarly, if "a person ...
writes a threatening letter to the President and places it in his desk with no intention
of sending it, yet later finds that a family member has accidentally mailed the letter,"
he would not have knowingly mailed the communication. Id. Neither person would
have made a true threat because the proscribed conduct in both circumstances was
not done "knowingly." However, as one can see, only in rare circumstances will this
"knowingly" requirement not be met.
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tive test comes in two forms: the specific intent to carry out the
threat test and the specific intent to threaten test. Like the objective tests, both subjective tests require that the defendant knowingly made the statement. In addition, the specific intent to carry
out the threat version states that the government must also prove
that the defendant actually intended to carry out the threat. The
second type of subjective standard, the specific intent to threaten
test, instead requires the government to show that the defendant
also intended for the communication to be threatening (or intended for the recipient to feel threatened). 43
The differences between the objective and subjective tests are
significant in two respects. First, the defenses available to a defendant depend on which test the court applies. For instance, a defense that the speaker did not intend for the statement to be
threatening would not be permitted in an objective test jurisdiction
because it would be irrelevant. Similarly, defenses based on mental
defect or voluntary intoxication, which are available in most jurisdictions as a defense to specific intent crimes, would only be available when a court applies a subjective test, not an objective test. In
United States v. Twine, the court recognized such a distinction. 44
There, the defendant was convicted of violating two federal statutes which prohibited the making of threats. 45 In determining
whether the defendant's diminished capacity defense was permissible, the court explained that it must first "determine whether the
aforementioned statutes require proof of specific intent. This inquiry is necessary because diminished capacity, like voluntary intoxication, generally is only a defense when specific intent is at issue. "46 Another example is United States v. Myers, where the court
held that a defendant who had been diagnosed with post-traumatic
stress disorder could not raise a diminished capacity defense after
the court applied an objective test in its true threats analysis. 47
43

The aforementioned Magleby opinion adopts the specific intent to threaten test.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
44
853 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1988).
45
Id. at 677 (affirming conviction based on violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 875(c), 876
(1982)).
46
Id. at 679 (citing United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 998-1002 (D.C. Cir.
1972)).
47
104 F.3d 76, 80-81 (5th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Johnson, 14 F.3d 766,
771 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that "evidence of diminished mental capacity" was prop-
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The second important difference arises when a court is making a
constitutional interpretation on the issue of intent. A court's constitutional determination establishes the baseline from which a legislature must operate. 48 Thus, if a court holds that the proper constitutional test for true threats is an objective one, the
constitutional baseline is the objective test. Consequently, the legislature, when drafting a statute, can require the threat being regulated to meet either the objective or subjective intent test. If the
legislature adopts a statute that meets the constitutional baseline of
an objective test, a defendant can be prosecuted under the statute
if his threatening communication passes either the objective or subjective standard. However, if a court adopts the subjective test as
the constitutional baseline, any statute which does not require the
specific intent to carry out the threat or specific intent for the
statement to be taken as threatening (depending on which subjective test is adopted) would be unconstitutional. For instance, if a
court adopts a subjective intent test, but its legislature passes a
statute requiring that only the objective test be met, the statute will
be found unconstitutional because it falls below the subjective test
baseline. If, however, a court's interpretation is based on statutory
construction, and is not one of constitutional proportion, then this
issue will not arise. Under these circumstances, the legislature, not
the court, will determine the meaning of true threats with regard to
the respective statute.
C. Lower Courts and the Mens Rea of Subjective Tests

As mentioned earlier, the subjective test comes in two forms,
both of which were almost uniformly rejected by the lower courts
between the time of Watts and Black. The first version of the subjective test requires the government to prove that the speaker, in
addition to knowingly making the statement, had the specific intent
to carry out the threat. The Supreme Court alluded to this test in
Watts when it cited Judge Wright's dissenting opinion from the
erly excluded because only a showing of general intent was required); United States v.
Richards, 415 F. Supp. 2d 547, 551 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (applying an objective test and
holding that a defendant's "evident ... mental health problems ... do not prevent his
threats from being 'true threats"').
48
A court's constitutional determination will also influence future courts' interpretations of existing statutes.
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D.C. Circuit's Watts decision. 49 In his dissent, Judge Wright asserted that the government should have to prove that the defendant intended to carry out the threat. 50 This test was apparently
based on the belief that "only when the maker of the threat has a
subjective intention of carrying it out is there an actual danger." 51
In its Watts opinion, the Supreme Court seemed to agree with
Judge Wright (or, at _the very least, shared his disapproval of the
earlier Ragansky approach) when it expressed "grave doubts"
about the contrary interpretation espoused by the D.C. Circuit majority.52 However, as noted earlier, the Court refused to conclusively decide the issue. It was not long before the lower courts took
advantage of the Court's indecisive language and discarded the notion that the government must prove the defendant's intention to
carry out the threat.
In a case decided only four months after the Supreme Court's
decision in Watts, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of intent in
the same context, a threat made against the President of the
United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871. In Roy v. United
States, the court held that the government was not required to
show that the defendant actually intended to carry out the threat. 53
The court persuasively argued that this subjective standard, requiring the specific intent to carry out the threat, unduly interfered
with the purposes associated with regulating true threats, namely
eliminating the fear, disruption, and costs of investigation and prevention associated with threatening speech. 54 Regardless of
whether the defendant intended to carry out the threat, the court
posited that "an apparently serious threat may cause the mischief
49

See supra note 36.
Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 686-89 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., dissentin?i).
'Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 878 n.15 {9th Cir. 1969) {characterizing Judge
Wright's reasoning).
52
See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
53
416 F.2d at 878.
54
Id. at 877 {If a true threat is made, "then the threat would tend to have a restrictive effect upon the free exercise of Presidential responsibilities, regardless of whether
the person making the threat actually intends to assault the President."); see also id.
at 878 ("Whether [the defendant] acted from an intention to assault the President or
from youthful mischief, he necessarily set in motion emergency security measures that
might have impeded the President's activities and movement and which certainly resulted in additional investigatory and precautionary activities.").
50
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or evil" that the statute sought to avoid. 55 Based on this reasoning,
the court adopted the reasonable speaker objective test. Like the
Court in Watts, the circuit court in Roy was more concerned with
proper statutory construction than constitutional interpretation.
The other circuits quickly followed suit in dismissing this version
of the subjective test. For instance, in United States v. Hart, the
Tenth Circuit noted the Watts citation to Judge Wright's dissenting
opinion but agreed with Roy and held that the government did not
need to prove that the "defendant actually intend[ed] to carry out
the threat." 56 The only court of appeals which did not reject this
subjective test outright was the Fourth Circuit. In United States v.
Patillo, the court noted the language of Watts and expressly rejected the "Raginsky [sic] test of intention." 57 Instead, the court
held that "an essential element of guilt is a present intention either
to injure the President, or incite others to injure him, or to restrict
his movements. " 58 The court required the government to show the
defendant had one of these three possible intents, but also said that
the government could meet its burden if it were to prove that the
speaker should have "anticipate[ d] that [his statement] would be
transmitted to law enforcement"-a form of an objective intent
standard. 59 This interpretation, which was more statutory than constitutional, was seemingly limited only to threats made against the
President in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871. For example, two years
later, in United States v. Maisonet, the Fourth Circuit adopted an
objective test for prosecutions under Section 876.fi) Similarly, in
United States v. Darby, the Fourth Circuit held that "in a prosecution under [S]ection 875(c), the government need not prove intent
(or ability) to carry out the threat." 61 Although the specific intent to
55

Id. at 877.
457 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1972); see also, e.g., United States v. Vincent, 681
F.2d 462, 464 (6th Cir. 1982) (rejecting the subjective intent to carry out the threat test
and adopting "the rule of the Ninth Circuit, set out in Roy v. United States"); United
States v. Compton, 428 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that it was "not necessary
to establish an intention to carry out the threat").
57
438 F.2d 13, 14, 16 (4th Cir. 1971) (en bane).
58
Id. at 16.
5• Id.
60
484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973). 18 U.S.C. § 876 (1970) prohibited the mailing
of a letter containing a threat to injure the addressee.
61
37 F.3d 1059, 1064 n.3 (4th Cir. 1994). 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1988) read as follows:
"Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication contain56
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carry out the threat test was repeatedly and resoundingly rejected
by nearly every court, it remained a favorite of hopeful defendants.
In Rogers v. United States, the Supreme Court "granted certiorari to resolve an apparent conflict among the Courts of Appeals
concerning the elements of the offense proscribed by [Section]
87l(a)." 62 This conflict centered on the opposing approaches of the
Roy and Patillo courts regarding the intent requirement of Section
871. However, instead of resolving the mens rea question (at least
with respect to this type of threat), the Court reversed the defendant's conviction based on a procedural error committed by the
trial court and did not address the intent issue for which it had
granted certiorari in the first place. 63 The Court held that this procedural violation was not harmless error because the judge's response was "fraught with potential prejudice"; 64 notably, the violation was never raised by the defendant at any stage of the
litigation. 65 It was second down, and the Court punted once again.
However, all was not lost when it came to the issue of intent. In a
concurring opinion joined by Justice Douglas, Justice Marshall
reached the merits question and provided a new approach to the
mens rea required for threatening speech. According to Justice
Marshall, only those "threats that the speaker intends to be interpreted as expressions of an intent to kill or injure" should be proscribed.66 With this assertion, Justice Marshall introduced the second version of the subjective test: the specific intent to threaten
test. In addition to proving that the defendant knowingly made the
statement, the government would have to show an additional specific intent element-that the defendant intended for the statement
to be threatening.

ing ... any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined not more than $1,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
62
422 U.S. 35, 36 (1975). 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) is the statutory provision that prohibits
threats against the President.
63
As Justice Marshall stated in a concurrence, "[t]he Court today seizes on [the error] to reverse the conviction, leaving unresolved the issue that we granted certiorari
to consider." Id. at 42 (Marshall, J., concurring).
64
Id. at 41 (majority opinion).
65
Id. The issue became known after the Solicitor General "confessed error." Id. at
42 (Marshall, J., concurring).
66
Id. at 47 ("This construction requires proof that the defendant intended to make a
threatening statement.").
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Although Justice Marshall, like those before him, engaged
mostly in statutory construction,67 he did express a special concern
for finding an interpretation consistent with the values of the First
Amendment. Worried that an objective test approach, like that
adopted in Ragansky and Roy, swept too broadly, Justice Marshall
explained that courts "should be particularly wary of adopting such
a standard for a statute that regulates pure speech. " 68 Because the
negligence standard of such an objective test, which "charg[es] the
defendant with responsibility for the effect of his statements on his
listeners," would have a chilling effect on speech, Justice Marshall
believed an objective test "impose[d] an unduly stringent standard
in this sensitive area. " 69
In addition to rejecting the negligence standard of an objective
approach, Justice Marshall also dismissed the other version of the
subjective test (the specific intent to carry out the threat standard):
"I would ... require proof that the speaker intended his statement
to be taken as a threat, even if he had no intention of actually carrying it out. " 10 This is because "threats may be costly and dangerous to society in a variety of ways, even when their authors have no
intention whatever of carrying them out." 11 Justice Marshall believed his particular subjective test struck the proper balance between regulating threatening speech and protecting the values embodied in the First Amendment. For Justice Marshall, the specific
intent to carry out the threat subjective standard did not offer
enough protection against the harms of threatening speech; at the
same time, the objective tests went too far in regulating pure
67
Marshall based his interpretation partly on the legislative history of § 871. See id.
at 44-46.
68
Id. at 47.
69
Id. at 47-48. Justice Marshall also made the following observation:
Statements deemed threatening in nature only upon "objective" consideration
will be deterred only if persons criticizing the President are careful to give a
wide berth to any comment that might be construed as threatening in nature.
And that degree of deterrence would have substantial costs in discouraging the
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate the First Amendment is intended
to protect.
Id. (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
70
Rogers, 422 U.S. at 48 (Marshall, J., concurring).
71
Id. at 46-47. For instance, "[a] threat made with no present intention of carrying it
out may still restrict the President's movements and require a reaction from those
charged with protecting the President." Id. at 47.
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speech. Although many commentators would follow Justice Marshall's lead, few courts did the same. 72
Before Black, only one circuit adopted Justice Marshall's specific mens rea approach to threatening speech. In United States v.
Twine, the Ninth Circuit held that for prosecutions under two federal threat statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 875 and 876), the government
must show that the defendant had "an intent to threaten," a specific intent element, when he made the threatening communication.73 Like Justice Marshall, the Twine court rejected the subjective specific intent to carry out the threat test. 74 However, the court
made clear that the application of the specific intent to threaten
test did not conflict with the circuit's earlier statements in Roy. Because "[a] threat against the President ... is qualitatively different
from a threat against a private citizen or other public official," the
court held that the objective test would continue to apply to prosecutions for threats made against the President. 75 Thus, the court's
subjective test would only apply to charges under these two federal
statutes. Other than this limited application, no other circuit
adopted Justice Marshall's subjective test, and most either ig-

72
See, e.g., Blakey & Murray, supra note 10, at 1065 ("Justice Marshall once advanced a compelling argument in favor of such a standard [of a subjective test for intent]. We wholeheartedly agree with it."); see also infra notes 73-78 and accompanyin¥, text.
'853 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1988). 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1982) prohibited communications made in interstate or foreign commerce containing a threat to kidnap or injure
any person. Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 876 (1982) prohibited communications deposited in
the mail containing a threat to kidnap or injure any person.
74
Twine, 853 F.2d at 681 n.4 ("Our holding that specific intent to threaten and to
transmit the threat are essential elements of the crimes defined by§§ 875(c) and 876
does not conflict or disagree with the clear pronouncement of other circuits that specific intent (or ability) to carry out the threat is not an essential element under these
sections.").
75
Id. at 681 (quoting Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1969)) (emphasis omitted). The Ninth Circuit is the only court to have drawn such a distinction
between threats made against the President and threats made against private citizens.
Every other circuit (with the narrow and limited exception of the Fourth Circuit, see
supra notes 57-61) has treated the intent required for a true threat to be the same regardless of whether the threat was directed at the President or at some other person.
This author agrees with the majority of circuits that have applied the same intent
standard across the board. The required mens rea should be the same for threats
made against private persons and threats made against the President.
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nored 76 or expressly rejected it. 77 Perhaps the Seventh Circuit provided the best explanation for why the subjective test proposed by
Justice Marshall never gained much traction: "Although we owe
the view of a single Justice great respect, we cannot treat it as stating the governing law. Here ... the weight of authority is to the
contrary. Therefore, ... we reaffirm ... the objective standard as
the proper standard for [punishing threatening speech]." 78 By the
time Justice Marshall articulated his approach, most circuits had already committed themselves to an objective test.

D. Lower Courts and the Mens Rea of Objective Tests
Between Watts and Black, the preferred approach of the lower
courts, by an overwhelming margin, was the objective test. As mentioned earlier, there are three types of objective tests: reasonable
speaker, reasonable listener, and reasonable neutral. 79 The first
type, the reasonable speaker test, holds that a communication is a
true threat if it was made "under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be inter76
See, e.g., United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997) (applying the
reasonable speaker test with no mention of Justice Marshall's subjective standard);
United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that "[t]he test
for whether a statement is a threat is an objective one," with no reference to Justice
Marshall's subjective standard); United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262,
1265 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The only intent requirement is that the defendant intentionally or knowingly communicates his threat, not that he intended or was able to
carry out his threat."); United States v. Callahan, 702 F.2d 964, 965 (11th Cir. 1983)
(applying the reasonable listener test and making no mention of Justice Marshall's
subjective standard); United States v. Vincent, 681 F.2d 462, 464 (6th Cir. 1982)
(adopting the reasonable speaker test set forth in Roy with no reference to Justice
Marshall's subjective standard).
77
See, e.g., United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[E]very circuit to have addressed the question, with the exception of the Ninth, has construed
Section 875(c) as a general-intent crime.") (citing United States v. Whiffen, 121 F.3d
18, 21 (1st Cir. 1997)); United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 81 (5th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782-83 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Darby, 37
F.3d 1059, 1063-66 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 149 (6th
Cir. 1992)). Seemingly unfazed, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its approach a decade
later in United States v. King, 122 F.3d 808, 809 (9th Cir.1997).
78
United States v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 556 (7th Cir. 1994).
79
For a more in-depth analysis of each objective test and its respective following in
the circuit courts before Black, see G. Robert Blakey and Brian J. Murray's impressive article that thoroughly details the area. Blakey & Murray, supra note 10, at 9371010.
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preted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement
as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm." 80 In
addition to the intent element common to all objective tests (knowingly making the statement), the reasonable speaker test supplies
an additional general intent requirement. Under the reasonable
speaker test, the speaker must have acted negligently: the government must prove that the defendant knowingly made a statement
that he should have known was threatening. However, this is a
much easier test for the government to satisfy than Justice Marshall's specific intent to threaten test.
Before Black, the reasonable speaker test was the most popular
standard and was adhered to by several circuits when interpreting a
variety of statutes. The first court to adopt it was the Ninth Circuit
in the aforementioned Roy case. 81 Interestingly, the court found
that, although it was regulating pure speech, "[u]nlike the situation
in Watts v. United States, there does not appear to be a free speech
issue in this case. " 82 The Sixth Circuit quickly followed suit in
adopting the reasonable speaker test, 83 and the Second,84 Third,85
Seventh,86 and Tenth87 Circuits were not far behind. Notably, each
of these circuits traced their reasonable speaker roots back to
Roy. 88

80

United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Roy) (emphasis
omitted).
81
416 F.2d at 877-78. This approach was reaffirmed in Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at
1265.
82
Roy, 416 F.2d at 879 n.17 (internal citations omitted). ·
83
United States v. Lincoln, 462 F.2d 1368, 1369 (6th Cir. 1972) ("We ... adopt the
construction of the Ninth Circuit in Roy v. United States."); see also United States v.
Vincent, 681 F.2d 462, 464 (6th Cir. 1982) (affirming Lincoln and the reasonable
speaker test).
84
United States v. Johnson, 14 F.3d 766, 768 (2d Cir. 1994) ("It is well settled that
[Section] 871 requires only a showing of general intent. The Ninth Circuit, in the leadinfil case on this question, [Roy,] held that [the reasonable speaker test applies].").
5
Kosma, 951 F.2d at 557 (adopting the reasonable speaker test of Roy).
86
United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1986) (adopting the reasonable speaker test and quoting Roy); see also United States v. Khorrami, 895 F.2d
1186, 1192 (7th Cir. 1990) (reaffirming Hoffman).
87
United States v. Hart, 457 F.2d 1087, 1090-91 (10th Cir. 1972) (adopting the reasonable speaker test of Roy).
88
The importance of this fact will be discussed shortly. See infra notes 91-93 and
accompanying text.
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In United States v. Fulmer, the First Circuit joined its peers and
adopted the reasonable speaker version of the objective test. 89 In a
lengthy opinion, the court explained why the reasonable speaker
test, and not the reasonable listener test, was "the appropriate
standard under which a defendant may be convicted for making a
threat":
This standard not only takes into account the factual context in
which the statement was made, but also better avoids the perils
that inhere in the "reasonable-recipient standard," namely that
the jury will consider the unique sensitivity of the recipient. We
find it particularly untenable that, were we to apply [the reasonable listener standard], a defendant may be convicted for making
an ambiguous statement that the recipient may find threatening
because of events not within the knowledge of the defendant. 90
In addition to the intent element common to all objective tests, the
Fulmer court wanted to require a showing of negligence, an element that does not appear in the reasonable listener test.
Interestingly, for the reasonable speaker test, what started as
pure statutory construction morphed into a constitutional interpretation of true threats. Although the Roy decision expressly stated
that it found no First Amendment issue when advocating the reasonable speaker test, future courts relied on Roy's objective test as
a constitutional standard. For instance, in United States v. Merrill,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed its holding in Roy and dismissed the defendant's constitutional claim, noting that courts "interpreting 18
U.S.C. § 871 [as in Roy] ... have uniformly concluded that 'true'
threats, of the type proscribed by the statute, are not constitutionally protected speech."91 Similarly, in United States v. OrozcoSantillan, the court held that the reasonable person standard, as
stated in Roy, defined the scope of "a 'true' threat" as speech that
"is unprotected by the [F]irst [A]mendment. " 92 In perhaps the
clearest example of this transition from pure statutory construction
89

108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997).
Id. For a discussion of why courts such as the one in Fulmer adopted an objective
test instead of a subjective test, see infra notes 206-12, 217, and accompanying text.
91
746 F.2d 458, 462 (9th Cir. 1984).
92
903 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1492-93 (making the same assertions as the court in Orozco-Santillan).
90
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to constitutional interpretation, the court in United States v. Hanna
explained that "a statement is [a] true threat for the purposes of
§ 871(a) and the First Amendment if" it meets the reasonable
speaker test first adopted in Roy. 93 Put simply, the extremely influential Roy standard, which was expressly decided without the First
Amendment in mind, became a test of constitutional proportion.
Until Black (and even after), it represented the majority approach
to the meaning of true threats and its required intent.
The reasonable listener test, the second version of the objective
test, takes a different perspective: a communication is a true threat
if "an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the [statement] would interpret it as a threat of injury." 94
Unlike the reasonable speaker test, this test serves only as a jurisdiction's definition of a true threat and does not provide an additional intent element. In reasonable listener jurisdictions, the only
intent element is that the statement was knowingly made. Even
though it was not as widespread as the reasonable speaker standard, this test also enjoyed a significant following. Beginning with
the Fourth Circuit's articulation of it in United States v. Maisonet, 95
panels from the Second,% Seventh,97 Eighth,98 and Eleventh99 Circuits all adopted versions of the reasonable listener test. For instance, in United States v. Malik, the Second Circuit held that the
test for determining whether a communication is a threat "is an objective one" and directly quoted the language of Maisonet. 100 Similarly, Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, opined that
93

293 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002).
United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973).
Id. Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit adopted a subjective test, at least partially, for
threats made against the President, see United States v. Patillo, 438 F.2d 13, 16 (4th
Cir. 1971), but an objective test for other forms of threatening speech. See supra notes
57--60 and accompanying text.
% United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994).
97
United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990); see also United
States v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming Schneider). Seemingly contradicting itself, the court in Aman also cited the reasonable speaker test as the definition of a threatening statement. Id. This exemplifies the confusion underlying the issue of intent and threatening speech.
98
United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996); see also United
States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming Dinwiddie).
99
United States v. Callahan, 702 F.2d 964, 965 (11th Cir. 1983).
100
Malik, 16 F.3d at 49 (quoting United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th
Cir. 1973)).
94
95
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"(t]he test for whether a statement is a threat is an objective one; it
is not what the defendant intended but whether the recipient could
reasonably have regarded the defendant's statement as a threat." 101
Although it was rarely (if ever) mentioned by the courts that adhered to the reasonable listener test, this version of the objective
standard does have a link to the Court's pronouncement in Watts.
Because one of the Watts factors was the reaction of the audience,
it is plausible to construe the reasonable listener test as a particular
application of this specific Watts factor.
Unlike Roy and the reasonable speaker test, the foundational
opinion of the reasonable listener test did consider the First
Amendment implications of its approach. In Maisonet, the Fourth
Circuit held the following:
Even when the defense is based on a claim of (F]irst
[A]mendment rights, ... (i]f there is substantial evidence that
tends to show beyond a reasonable doubt that an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the letter
would interpret it as a threat of injury, the court should submit
the case to the jury. 102
As time went on, the test became synonymous with the meaning of
unprotected speech for these circuits. For example, in United States
v. Hart, the Eighth Circuit held that "(t]o determine whether a true
threat exists, a court must analyze the alleged threat in light of its
entire factual context and determine whether the recipient of the
alleged threat could reasonably conclude that it expresses a determination or intent to injure presently or in the future." 103 However,
as noted above, the reasonable listener test did not require an additional showing of intent (negligence or otherwise) beyond the
knowledge standard shared by all objective tests.
The third and final objective standard is the reasonable neutral
test. It generally asserts that "a communication is a threat ... if 'in
its context (it] would have a reasonable tendency to create appre-

101

Schneider, 910 F.2d at 1570 ("A threat is not a state of mind in the threatener; it is
an appearance to the victim.") (quoting United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 310
(7th Cir. 1987)).
102
Maisonet, 484 F.2d at 1358.
103
212 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted).
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hension that its originator will act according to its tenor."' 104 Like
the reasonable listener test, this standard only identifies the meaning of a true threat-the actus reus-not any additional intent
standard. Consequently, the only intent the government must
prove is that the speaker knowingly made the statement. This version was the least popular of the objective tests and enjoyed a de105
voted following only in the Fifth Circuit.
To summarize, with little guidance from the Supreme Court, the
circuit courts fashioned four possible intent standards for true
threats; two were based on a subjective test and two were based on
an objective test. The first subjective test was the specific intent to
carry out the threat test. Under this standard, the government must
prove two intent elements: that the defendant knowingly made the
statement and that he intended to carry out the threat. The specific
intent to threaten standard, articulated by Justice Marshall, also
required the government to prove two intent elements: the government had to show that the defendant knowingly made the
statement and intended it to be threatening. The third intent standard was embodied by the reasonable speaker test. According to
this approach, the government must prove two intent elements.
Namely, the defendant must have knowingly made the statement
and should have known of its threatening character. The final intent approach was used by the reasonable listener and reasonable
neutral standards. Here, the government only needed to prove one
intent element-that the defendant knowingly made the statement.
E. The Penultimate Step: Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists

In perhaps the most important, and certainly most controversial,
true threats case between Watts and Black, a sharply fractured
Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, decided Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists. 106
Four physicians and two health clinics that provided abortions
"brought suit under FACE [Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
104

United States v. Morales, 272 F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States
v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 79 (5th Cir. 1997)) (alteration in original).
105
See id.; see also supra notes 81-89, 95-101, and accompanying text.
106
290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en bane).
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Act] claiming that they were targeted with threats by the American
Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA)" and others. 107 The threats that
allegedly targeted them included "GUILTY" posters which identified several doctors (including the plaintiffs) and the infamous
"Nuremberg Files" website. 108 The trial court denied ACLA's
summary judgment motion, and the jury returned a verdict against
the defendants; the court then enjoined ACLA from publishing
posters and other materials that threatened the plaintiffs. 109 A
Ninth Circuit panel reversed the conviction, citing First Amendment concerns. However, the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en
bane, disagreed with the earlier panel, and affirmed the jury's decision.110
Although this case presents a variety of important First
Amendment and true threats issues, only the debate over intent
will be discussed here. As the en bane court noted at the outset,
"the first task is to define 'threat' for purposes of the [FACE] Act.
This requires a definition that comports with the First Amendment, that is, a 'true threat.' The Supreme Court has provided
benchmarks, but no definition. " 111 After remarking on the lack of
guidance from the Supreme Court, the majority made the following observation:
Thus, Watts was the only Supreme Court case that discussed
the First Amendment in relation to true threats before we first
confronted the issue. Apart from holding that Watts's crack
about L.B.J. was not a true threat, the Court set out no standard
for determining when a statement is a true threat that is unpro107

Id. at 1062.
Id. The website was a "compilation about those whom the ACLA anticipated one
day might be put on trial for crimes against humanity. The 'GUILTY' posters identifying specific physicians were circulated in the wake of a series of 'WANTED' and
'un WANTED' posters that had identified other doctors who performed abortions before they were murdered." Id.
109
Id. at 1062-63 (citing Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v.
Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1995 (D. Or. 1998) (denying
summary judgment); Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am.
Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1155-56 (D. Or. 1999) (issuing the injunction)).
110
Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1063. Although it affirmed the jury's verdict, the
Ninth Circuit did "remand for consideration of whether the punitive damages award
comports with due process." Id.
111
Id. at 1071.
108
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tected speech under the First Amendment. Shortly after Watts
was rendered, we had to decide in Roy v. United States whether
[the defendant) made a true threat .... We adopted a 'reasonable speaker' test ... [and) have applied this test to threats statutes that are similar to FACE. Other circuits have, too. We see
no reason not to apply the same test to FACE. 112
Thus, the Ninth Circuit once again applied its familiar reasonable
speaker standard, originally set forth in Roy, as the test for distinguishing protected from unprotected speech.
With regard to an additional subjective intent element, the court
expressly held that "[i]t is not necessary that the defendant intend
to, or be able to carry out his threat; the only intent requirement
for a true threat is that the defendant intentionally or knowingly
communicate the threat." 113 Put simply, if the speaker knowingly
made the statement and should have known of its threatening nature, then his speech is unprotected. According to the Ninth Circuit, this general intent standard was the best approach in light of
the purposes supporting the prohibition of true threats. 114 Because
the defendants knowingly made the statement and should have
foreseen that it would be understood as a threat, the court held
that the statement was not protected by the First Amendment and
affirmed the jury's verdict.
As noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit was closely divided. The decision was 6-5, and three dissenting opinions were issued. The dissenting opinion of Judge Berzon, which three of the other dissenting judges joined in full and the other dissenter joined in part,
articulated a new approach to the definition of true threats. Judge
Berzon, a relative newcomer to the court (she was appointed in
2000), discarded the objective test traditionally adhered to by the
112

Id. at 1074-75 (internal citations omitted).
ld. at 1075 (citing, inter alia, Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir.
1969)).
114
Specifically, the court remarked:
[The purpose of regulating threats] is not served by hinging constitutionality on
the speaker's subjective intent or capacity to do (or not to do) harm. Rather,
these factors go to how reasonably foreseeable it is to a speaker that the listener
will seriously take his communication as an intent to inflict bodily harm. This
suffices to distinguish a "true threat" from speech that is merely frightening.
Id. at 1076. The purposes are those outlined in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
388 (1992).
113
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Ninth Circuit and, most importantly for the purposes of this Note,
proposed a subjective intent standard.
The motive behind her suggested standard was a belief that the
reasonable speaker test espoused by the majority was "insufficiently cognizant of underlying First Amendment values." 115 Influenced by First Amendment libel jurisprudence, Judge Berzon
wanted to devise constitutional standards that vary with the context of the communication, as opposed to the majority's unitary
approach. 116 Towards this end, in the context of a public protest,
where First Amendment concerns are heightened, Judge Berzon
would require a showing of specific intent:
Although this court's cases on threats have not generally set any
state of mind requirements, I would . . . [require] in the public
protest context the additional consideration whether the defendant subjectively intended the specific victims to understand the
communication as an unequivocal threat that the speaker or his
agents or coconspirators would physically harm them. 117
This is a version of the "specific intent to threaten" subjective test;
she pushed for "the inclusion of a 'specific intent' requirement with
regard to the speaker's intent to threaten." 118 According to Judge
Berzon, the negligence standard of the objective test weakens First
Amendment protection "by holding speakers responsible for an
impact they did not intend" and, consequently, has a chilling effect
on speech. 119 By adding a specific intent element for speech made in
the context of public protest, a proper balance, at least in Judge
Berzon's eyes, is reached.
The split within the Ninth Circuit epitomized a larger division
that existed across the lower courts over the proper intent standard
for true threats. 120 As a result, the panoply of possible intent stan115

Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1101 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1104.
111
Id. at 1107.
118
Id. at 1107 n.8.
119
Id. at 1108 ("Unsure of whether their rough and tumble protected speech would
be interpreted by a reasonable person as a threat, speakers will silence themselves
rather than risk liability.").
120
See United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 718-19 (7th Cir. 1986) (Will, J., dissenting) ("Following Watts, the courts have developed various formulations to describe the degree of mens rea the government must prove to establish a 'true
116
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<lards was causing a cacophony in the jurisprudence.121 This confusion was symptomatic of the Supreme Court's refusal to adopt a
clear definition for true threats. As Professor Gey observed at the
time, "the lack of clear guidance from the Supreme Court on this
subject has fostered the proliferation of eclectic and contradictory
standards." 122 The pending appeal from the Planned Parenthood
case seemed like an opportune time for the Court to clarify the jurisprudence, including the issue of intent. As one commentator
openly hoped, "[w]ith luck, the Supreme Court will soon take the
opportunity to clarify matters, perhaps even with the Planned Parenthood case." 123 Instead, the Court denied certiorari. 124 But, as
"luck" would have it, less than two weeks after the Ninth Circuit's
Planned Parenthood decision, the Court granted certiorari in a
group of cross-burning cases from Virginia, providing new hope
that the Court would settle, once and for all, the meaning of true
threats.125
III. THE COURT FINALLY SPEAKS: VIRGINIA

V. BLACK

In Virginia v. Black, the Court finally provided a definition of
true threats. Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice O'Connor
held that "'[t]rue threats' encompass those statements where the
threat."'); see also Gey, Nuremberg Files, supra note 10, at 545 ("[T]he lower courts
cannot even agree on which factors should be the focal point of First Amendment
cases dealing with threats, much less on how much protection the Constitution offers
such speech.").
121
See, e.g., United States v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1994) (defining a
"threat" using the reasonable listener standard but defining a threatening "statement"
using the reasonable speaker test).
122
Gey, Nuremberg Files, supra note 10, at 545; see also Strauss, supra note 10, at
232 ("Despite numerous opportunities to update the common law rule for threat
speech, the Supreme Court has demonstrated an unfounded refusal to act. In light of
this, several circuit courts of appeal and at least two state supreme courts have developed their own legal rules for dealing with threat speech .... An unclear and disparate approach to threat speech risks contradictory outcomes and exposes citizens to
potentially unfair penalties for a simple slip of the tongue.").
123
Strauss, supra note 10, at 273.
12
• Am.
Coalition of Life Activists v. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc., 539 U.S. 958 (2003). The petition for writ of certiorari was denied on June 27, 2003.
125
Virginia v. Black, 535 U.S. 1094 (2002) (granting certiorari). The petition for writ
of certiorari was granted on May 28, 2002; the Ninth Circuit's Planned Parenthood
opinion was filed on May 16, 2002.
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speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or
group of individuals. The speaker need not actually intend to carry
out the threat." 126 She also explained that "[i]ntimidation in the
constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true
threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of
persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm
or death. " 121
The Supreme Court's Black decision was based on three separate criminal prosecutions. Each defendant was charged with, and
later convicted of, violating Virginia's cross-burning law. The statute, Section 18.2-423 of the Virginia Code, prohibited the burning
of a cross "with the intent of intimidating any person or group of
persons." 128 It also had a provision which stated that "[a]ny such
burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate."129 The namesake of the decision, Barry Black, was convicted under the statute for burning a cross at a Ku Klux Klan rally
that he led. The cross was burned on private property with. the
owner's permission but could be seen from a public highway
nearby. The two other defendants, Richard Elliott and Jonathan
O'Mara, were convicted for attempting to burn a cross in the yard
of an African American neighbor. 130 All three defendants appealed
to the Supreme Court of Virginia, arguing that the cross-burning
statute was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated the
cases for the purposes of appeal.
Relying on the Supreme Court's prior decision in R.A. V. v. City
of St. Paul, the Supreme Court of Virginia declared the Virginia
126

Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
128
The statute read in full:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating
any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the
property of another, a highway or other public place. Any person who shall violate any provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. Any such
burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-423 (1996); see also Black, 538 U.S. at 348 (internal quotations
omitted).
129
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-423 (1996); see also Black, 538 U.S. at 348.
130
Black, 538 U.S. at 348, 350.
127
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statute "analytically indistinguishable from the ordinance found
unconstitutional in R.A. V." and held that it discriminated on the
basis of content since it "selectively chooses only cross burning because of its distinctive message. ,,m In addition, the court found the
prima facie clause overbroad. 132 Consequently, the court held the
statute facially unconstitutional. Three justices dissented from the
majority opinion and asserted that the statute was constitutionally
permissible because it only proscribed true threats. 133 The dissenters also distinguished the Virginia statute from the ordinance of
R.A. V. and had no problem with the prima facie provision because
the burden of proof remained on the state. 134 The Commonwealth
of Virginia petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari for the consolidated appeal.
As can be gleaned from the briefs and oral argument, the scope
and contours of the true threats doctrine was not the focus of the
parties or Justices involved. 135 Instead, the viewpoint and content
discrimination analysis of R.A. V. and the statute's prima facie provision consumed much of the ink and spoken word of the appellate
process. Thus, it is not surprising that the Court's definition of
"true threats" consisted of only two sentences and the definition of
"intimidation" a single sentence. In the briefs, during oral argurn Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 742, 744 (Va. 2001); see R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
132
Black, 553 S.E.2d at 738.
133
Id. at 751 (Hassell, J., dissenting) ("Thus, applying the clear and unambiguous
language in Code § 18.2-423 in conjunction with our established definition of intimidation, which the majority ignores, I conclude that Code § 18.2-423 only proscribes
conduct which constitutes 'true threats.' ... It is well established that true threats of
violence can be proscribed by statute without infringing upon the First Amendment.").
134
Id. at 753-56.
135
For instance, the term "true threats" appeared only once in the Commonwealth
of Virginia's appellate brief. Brief of Petitioner at 26, Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No.
01-1107). Similarly, it was substantively used only once in the amicus curiae brief filed
by the United States. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 18-19, Black,
538 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107). Although true threats received more attention in
the respondent's appellate brief and the petitioner's reply brief, the true threats doctrine was completely overshadowed by the debate over viewpoint discrimination and
R.A. V. See generally Brief on Merits for Respondents, Black, 583 U.S. 343 (2003)
(No. 01-1107); Reply Brief of Petitioner, Black, 583 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107).
Similarly, at oral argument, the focus was on R.A. V. and the essence of viewpoint discrimination, not on the meaning of true threats. See generally Oral Argument Transcript, Black, 583 U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107).
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men ts, and in the Court's opinion, the discussion of the true threats
doctrine served an ancillary purpose-providing the foundation
from which the content discrimination analysis of R.A. V. could begin.
In R.A. V., the Court posited that "[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire
class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea
or viewpoint discrimination exists. " 136 In order to apply this exception to the general prohibition on content discrimination, the Court
in Black first needed to define true threats (and intimidation);
then, it could determine whether the present statute successfully
proscribed only those threats which are "a particularly virulent
form of intimidation. " 137 The Court held that:
The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is
a particularly virulent form of intimidation. Instead of prohibiting all intimidating messages, Virginia may choose to regulate
this subset of intimidating messages in light of cross burning's
long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence. 138
Although the Court held that Virginia could constitutionally prohibit cross burning done with the intent to intimidate, a plurality
found the statute unconstitutional because of its prima facie
clause. 139 Interestingly, the Court affirmed the Virginia Supreme
136

R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388. For instance, "the Federal Government can criminalize
only those threats of violence that are directed against the President ... since the reasons why threats of violence are outside the First Amendment ... have special force
when applied to the person of the President." Id.
137
Black, 538 U.S. at 363.
138 Id.
139
Id. at 364 ("The prima facie evidence provision, as interpreted by the jury instruction [in Barry Black's trial], renders the statute unconstitutional."). Justice Scalia, a
member of the five justice majority in Parts I-III of Justice O'Connor's opinion of the
Court, dissented from this part of the decision regarding the prima facie provision. He
preferred remanding the judgment to the Virginia Supreme Court and allowing that
court to construe the prima facie provision; he believed that "there is no justification
for the plurality's apparent decision to invalidate that provision." Black, 538 U.S. at
368 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part). Three Justices who concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part-in
an opinion written by Justice Souter-agreed that the prima facie provision was problematic, but they would have held the statute unconstitutional regardless of how the
prima facie provision was construed. They believed the statute clearly violated R.A. V.
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Court's dismissal of Barry Black's conviction but only vacated the
judgments of Elliott and O'Mara and remanded their cases for further proceedings. 140
Because the Court's focus was not on carefully defining true
threats, but on providing a basis for its content discrimination
analysis, 141 the Court left a variety of viable interpretations in its
wake. Most importantly, at least for the purpose of this Note, the
Court's language failed to clearly settle the issue of intent. Although the Court did hold that the specific intent to carry out the
threat was not required for the communication to constitute a true
threat, little else with respect to intent was conclusively resolved. 142
There are three plausible interpretations of the Court's language
regarding the constitutionally required intent for true threats; this
Note will articulate each in turn. 143
First, the Court could have been adopting one of the objective
test approaches, which only require the defendant to have knowingly made the statement (and, for the reasonable speaker test,
that the defendant should have known of its threatening nature).
According to this interpretation, the phrase "means to communicate" used by the Court in Black is synonymous with the "knowingly" intent standard, which simply requires that the "statement
and did not meet any of its exceptions. Black, 538 U.S. at 380-82 (Souter, J., concurrin~ in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
1
Further proceedings included the determination of whether the prima facie clause
was severable from the rest of the statute and whether two of the defendants, Elliott
and O'Mara, could be retried. Black, 538 U.S. at 367-68.
141
See also Gey, A Few Questions, supra note 3, at 1294-95 ("Having found a First
Amendment pigeonhole into which she could shove the speech at issue in the Virginia
statute, Justice O'Connor chose not to investigate the nature of that pigeonhole or to
analyze whether cross burning is analogous to other forms of speech already lodged in
the 'true threats' slot.").
142
Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 ("The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the
threat.").
143
For the convenience of the reader, the Court's definitions of true threats and intimidation are reprinted here:
"True threats" encompass those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. The speaker need not
actually intend to carry out the threat. ... Intimidation in the constitutionally
proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a
threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in
fear of bodily harm or death.
Id. at 359-60 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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was not the result of mistake, duress, or coercion." 144 The definition's second clause, "a serious expression of an intent to commit
an act of unlawful violence," could be interpreted as only necessitating a showing that the statement was objectively a "serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence" (for
instance, as understood by a reasonable person). 145 Furthermore, as
noted above, the Court clearly rejected one of the two subjective
tests-the specific intent to carry out the threat standard. This has
led at least one commentator to assert that "the Black majority indicates that the relevant intent [for true threats] is merely the intent to utter whatever words are found to be threatening.... Thus,
it is sufficient to satisfy the Constitution if the speaker intended to
say the thing that created fear in a listener," even if he did not intend to create the fear. 146
Although the constitutional concept of intimidation does include
the specific intent to threaten standard, the Court stated that intimidation is merely a "type of true threat." 147 Thus, an objective
test interpretation would posit that because intimidation is merely
a type of true threat, the specific intent to threaten requirement
does not necessarily apply to all true threats but only to all proscribable intimidation speech. Moreover, the Court was certainly
aware of this subjective test and knew how to include it as a requirement (since it did so for intimidation). Consequently, if the
Court wanted such a specific intent showing for all true threats, it
could have easily said so. Instead, the Court provided no such requirement when it came to the definition of true threats. Finally, as
was discussed earlier, the objective test approach (in one of its
forms) was the predominant standard in all of the federal circuit
courts. If the Court wanted to change the landscape of the juris-

144
Black, 538 U.S. at 359; United States v. Hart, 457 F.2d 1087, 1090-91 (10th Cir.
1972) (emphasis omitted); see also supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
145
Black, 538 U.S. at 359. For instance, a pre-Black court that adopted an objective
test approach used strikingly similar language when articulating its own standard:
"[a]ll the courts to have reached the issue [of the meaning of true threats] have consistently adopted an objective test that focuses on whether a reasonable person would interpret the purported threat as a serious expression of an intent to cause a present or future harm." Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002)
(emphasis added).
146
Gey, A Few Questions, supra note 3, at 1346.
147
Black, 438 U.S. at 360 (emphasis added).
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prudence so dramatically, and adopt a specific intent to threaten
requirement, it would have done so in a more straightforward fashion. It is unlikely, according to this interpretation, that the Court
would reject every circuit court's position in two sentences of fairly
ambiguous language. For all these reasons, the Court's definition
could be interpreted as espousing an objective test approach. 148
Second, the Court could have been adopting the subjective "specific intent to threaten" standard for the entire category of true
threats. This interpretation is based on a different understanding of
the Court's use of the words "means to." 149 Instead of modifying
only "communicate," it applies to the entire phrase "communicate
a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence. "150 The defendant must intend to (mean to) communicate an
expression which is threatening. In other words, he must have the
specific intent to place the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.
The constitutional meaning of "intimidation" requires such a showing of intent. As the Court explained, for speech to be proscribed
as intimidating, the speaker must "direct[] a threat to a person or
group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of
bodily harm." 151 The Court also noted that intimidation is a "type
of true threat." 152 From the perspective of the subjective test interpretation, this could mean that intimidation is a type of true threat
because it requires the specific intent to threaten. According to this
148
Even proponents of this interpretation, however, would be hard-pressed to determine the objective test, if any, for which the Court expressed a preference.
149
The phrase "means to communicate" had only appeared in a Supreme Court reporter three times prior to Black. Notably, none of these instances were opinions of
the Court. The phrase was used twice in dissenting opinions. See Metromedia v. San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 555-56 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Relying on simplistic
platitudes about content, subject matter, and the dearth of other means to communicate, the billboard industry attempts to escape the real and growing problems ... in
protecting safety and preserving the environment in an urban area."); Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 586 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It becomes harder and
harder for citizens to find means to communicate with other citizens."). The third
time the phrase appears in the reporter is during the description of defense counsel's
oral argument. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 338 (1849). The opinion in
Black was the only time the term "means" has referred to intent instead of capability
or availability. Thus, prior Supreme Court usage provides no additional guidance as
to the potential meaning of "means to communicate."
0
" Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
m Id. at 360.
1;2 Id.
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understanding, the unifying theme of true threats, in all its forms,
would be the specific intent to threaten. For instance, harassment
may be considered another form of a true threat, different from intimidation, but similar in that the speaker must have the specific intent to cause fear. 153 Furthermore, the Court clearly held that the
other form of subjective intent, the specific intent to carry out the
threat, was not required. If the Court wanted to make the same
statement regarding the specific intent to threaten as it relates to
true threats generally, it could have easily done so. Instead, the
Court only rejected the specific intent "to carry out the threat"
standard and included the specific intent to threaten standard for
intimidation, a type of true threat.
Finally, the Court's distaste for the prima facie provision also
suggests its preference for a specific intent standard that requires
the showing of an intent to threaten for true threats. Although the
prima facie clause was discussed in light of the Court's definition of
intimidation, which clearly requires the intent to threaten, the language and tone of the opinion suggests a more expansive vision of
Justice Marshall's subjective test. The plurality explains that its
problem with the prima facie provision is that it fails to distinguish
constitutionally protected speech from unprotected speech. 154 Accordingly, "the provision chills constitutionally protected political
speech because of the possibility that the Commonwealth will
prosecute-and potentially convict-somebody engaging only in
lawful political speech at the core of what the First Amendment is
designed to protect. ... The First Amendment does not permit
such a shortcut." 155 Even though such statements were made in the
context of intimidation, the language certainly suggests a more expansive interpretation-one that requires that the specific intent to
threaten be an element for all true threats, not just intimidation.
Such inferences have convinced one commentator that "Black now
153

The author is not aware of any such example of harassing speech being proscribed as a true threat; it is merely a hypothetical example.
154
Black, 538 U.S. at 366 ("The prima facie provision makes no effort to distinguish ... between a cross burning done with the purpose of creating anger or resentment and a cross burning done with the purpose of threatening or intimidating a victim. It does not distinguish between a cross burning at a public rally or a cross burning
on a neighbor's lawn.") (emphasis added). Here, the Court is clearly contrasting the
case of Barry Black with that of Elliott and O'Mara.
155
Id. at 365, 367.
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confirms that proof of specific intent (aim) must be proved also in
threat cases." 156
The third possible interpretation of the true threats language in
Black is basically no interpretation at all. This understanding suggests that the Black opinion has little application outside the context of cross-burning, intimidation, and content discrimination. The
Court's opinion takes up six United States Reports pages discussing the history of cross burning, 157 four pages analyzing the statute
in light of R.A. V. and its statements on content discrimination, 158
five pages scrutinizing the constitutionality of the prima facie provision,159 and a single paragraph examining the meaning of true
threats. 1w Because the decision did not require an in-depth analysis
of true threats or a more thorough discussion of the doctrine's
scope and content, the Court may not have been attempting to
provide a complete definition of true threats, including what, if
any, intent standard is constitutionally required. In order to decide
the constitutionality of the statute, the Court needed only to decide
the meaning of intimidation and whether the statute's selection of
cross burning constituted impermissible content discrimination. In
fact, any discussion of an intent standard for true threats could
technically be classified as dictum. Thus, proponents of this interpretation believe that the Court was not trying to or did not definitively decide the issue of intent for true threats. As one observer,
who would likely endorse this understanding, explained: "although
the Supreme Court's decision in Virginia v. Black represents an
expansion and enrichment in First Amendment analysis, this case
should, and likely will, be restricted to its facts." 161 Given the prevalence of the objective intent standard before Black, this interpretation would not affect its pervasiveness.
Provided with a third opportunity to define the meaning of true
threats and to establish a constitutionally required intent standard,
the Court did not punt. However, this time it threw an incomplete

156

Hartley, supra note 10, at 33.
Black, 538 U.S. at 352-57.
158
Id. at 360-63.
159
Id. at 363-67.
160
Id. at 359-60.
161
Eric John Nies, Note, The Fiery Cross: Virginia v. Black, History, and the First
Amendment, 50 S.D. L. Rev. 182, 217 (2005).
157
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pass, failing to advance the issue beyond the original line of scrimmage.
IV. So THE COURT SPOKE, BUT WHAT DID THE LOWER COURTS
HEAR?

As discussed above, the lower courts charged with the task of interpreting Black had three viable options when it came to the constitutional intent standard for true threats. Each approach has
found its adherents.

A. The Objective Test Interpretations
Following Black, the vast majority of courts continued to use
one of the objective intent standards that saturated the pre-Black
landscape. For some, the language in Black expressly sanctioned
their traditional objective test approach. In United States v. Ellis,
the defendant, who was charged with making a threat against the
President, requested that the court interpret Black as establishing a
subjective intent standard for true threats. 162 The court rejected the
motion and held that the definition in Black was not inconsistent
with the reasonable speaker test adopted by the Third Circuit a
decade earlier in United States v. Kosma:
While Black does appear to provide a definition of a "true
threat," we do not agree with Defendant's interpretation of that
definition .... The language [of the definition in Black] merely
restates the Third Circuit's requirement that the speaker must
have some intent to communicate the statement, meaning that
the statement may not be a product of accident, coercion or duress.163

162

No. CR. 02-687-1, 2003 WL 22271671, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2003). The defendant claimed that "his actual intent was not to threaten, rather it was to communicate
the symptoms of his mental illness for the purposes of getting treatment." Id.
163
Id. at *4; see also United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991). The
court in Ellis also made the following observations:
In addition, the Black court specifically recognized that the speaker need not
actually intend to carry out the threat. ... As the Supreme Court pointed out,
intimidating speech is only one type of "true threat." Obviously, the concerns
when dealing with a statute that prohibits threats against the President of the
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According to this court, Black was consistent with the reasonable
speaker standard.
In Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board, 164 another court
reached a similar conclusion. One of the issues was whether a student's drawing constituted a true threat or was protected speech.
After holding that speech is unprotected as a true threat "if an objectively reasonable person would interpret the speech as a serious
expression of an intent to cause a present or future harm," the
court asserted that the speech must first be "knowingly communicated to either the object of the threat or a third person." 165 Thus,
the court understood the language in Black to stand solely for the
proposition that the speaker must have knowingly made the statement. After finding that the student did not knowingly communicate the drawing, the court held the speech to be protected by the
First Amendment. 166
This interpretation of Black has not been limited to federal
courts. In Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller, the Supreme Court of
Arizona, in deciding whether a letter to the editor of a newspaper
constituted a true threat, observed that an Arizona appellate court
"has adopted a substantially similar test for determining a 'true
threat' under the First Amendment" as the standard adopted in
Black. 167 That approach was the reasonable speaker test. The court
found that the letter was protected speech because it did "not believe that a reasonable person could view that letter as 'a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals."' 168 The court simply

United States are quite different than the concerns when dealing with a cross
burning statute.
Ellis, 2003 WL 22271671, at *4 (internal quotations omitted).
164
393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004).
165
ld. at 616 (citing, inter alia, Black, 538 U.S. at 359) (emphasis and internal quotations omitted).
166
Id. at 618.
167
Citizen Publ'g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 114 (Ariz. 2005) (holding that "'true
threats' are those statements made 'in a context or under such circumstances wherein
a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those
to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of [a person]'") (alteration in origina~ (quoting In re Kyle M., 27 P.3d 804, 808 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)).
1
Miller, 115 P.3d at 115 (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 359); see also Austad v. S.D.
Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, No. 23914, 2006 WL 2036166, at *5 (S.D. July 19, 2006)
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substituted the phrase "a reasonable person could view" in place of
Black's "means to communicate" and applied an objective intent
standard.
Finally, the court in United States v. Bly recently opined that the
language in Black not only supported an objective test but also explicitly rejected any specific intent requirement. 169 The court held
that the Fourth Circuit's reasonable listener test was still the guiding precedent for determining whether speech constituted a true
threat. 110 Responding to the defendant's motion that the definition
in Black required a showing of specific intent, the court posited
that such an interpretation was clearly incorrect. The court held
that the government was not required "to allege an intent to intimidate or injure," adding, "Black could not be clearer on this
point." 171 Notably, the court cites the Black opinion's rejection of
one subjective intent standard, the intent to carry out the threat, as
a signal that the Court rejected both specific intent tests-the intent to carry out the threat and the intent to threaten. 172
In addition to these courts, which held that the Black definition
affirmatively supported an objective intent standard, some courts
have continued to apply the objective test by ignoring or minimizing the application of Black in their true threats analyses. Amazingly, the Black opinion is frequently left out of the true threats
discussion. For instance, in United States v. Fuller, the Seventh Circuit extolled the virtues of an objective test for true threats in a
case involving threats made against the President. 173 Although the
court discussed Watts, it failed to even mention or cite the more re-

(quoting Black and applying the reasonable recipient objective test based on preBlack Eighth Circuit precedent).
169
No. CRIM. 3:04CR00011, 2005 WL 2621996, at *2 (W.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2005); see
suwa notes 4--7, 9 and accompanying text.
0
Bly, 2005 WL 2621996, at *l.
171
Id. at *2.
172
Id. Another court has made the same assumption. In Sheehan v. Gregoire, the
court held that "a true threat does not turn on the subjective intent of the speaker."
272 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1141 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (citing Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60;
Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2002) ("It is not necessary that the defendant intend to, or be able to carry out his threat, the only intent requirement for a true threat
is that the defendant intentionally or knowingly communicate the threat.")) (emphasis added).
173
387 F.3d 643, 646-48 (7th Cir. 2004).
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cent Black opinion; it simply adopted the reasonable person standard, based on Roy, and upheld the conviction. 114 Opinions by the
First,175 Fourth, 116 and Eleventh177 Circuits have all discussed the
meaning of true threats without a single citation to Black. The
same has occurred at the district court level as well. 178 Perhaps it is
because these courts cannot confidently assert the meaning of the
language in Black that they have instead relied on their respective
jurisdiction's entrenched objective intent standard for guidance.
Maybe these courts believe that Black only applies to cross burning
or content discrimination and is not relevant in the context of
threats against the President or other threatening speech. Perhaps
they think the Black decision merely affirmed the use of an objective test and thus discussion or citation of it is unnecessary. Whatever the reason, a surprising number of courts have paid little, if
any, attention to Black when discussing the meaning of true
threats.

B. The Subjective Test Interpretation
In upholding its continued use of an objective intent standard,
the aforementioned Ellis court asserted that there was "nothing in
the Black opinion to indicate that the Supreme Court intended to
overrule a majority of the circuits by adopting a subjective test
when dealing with 'true threats."' 119 Put another way, absent a
clearer statement from the Court, the circuit courts will not change
the firmly established precedent of their true threat jurisprudence,
11

Id. at 646-48.
See generally United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 15-17 (1st Cir. 2003) (applying the reasonable speaker objective test).
176
See generally United States v. Lockhart, 382 F.3d 447, 451-52 (4th Cir. 2004)
(comparing the Watts factors to the present circumstances in a prosecution for making
threats against the President).
m See generally United States v. Alaboud, 347 F.3d 1293, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 2003)
(agplying the reasonable neutral test).
7
See generally, e.g., United States v. Richards, 415 F. Supp. 2d 547 (E.D. Pa. 2005);
United States v. Veliz, No. 03 CR. 1473, 2004 WL 964005 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2004);
United States v. Oakley, No. CR. 02-123-01, 2003 WL 22425035 (E.D. Pa. May 30,
2003). interestingly, Judge Surrick from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania wrote
the opinion in both Oakley and Richards. He also authored the aforementioned Ellis
decision. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
11
• United States v. Ellis, No. CR. 02-687-1, 2003 WL 22271671, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July
15, 2003).
•
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namely the use of an objective intent standard. However, the
Tenth Circuit did find that the Court clearly adopted a subjective
intent standard in Black and changed its own approach accordingly. In United States v. Magleby, a decision that was briefly discussed at the outset of this Note, the court adopted Justice Marshall's specific intent test for true threats. The court stated that true
threats, "[u]nprotected by the Constitution[,] ... must be made
'with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or
death.' An intent to threaten is enough; the further intent to carry
out the threat is unnecessary." 180 While the Bly court quoted from
the language of Black that said the intent to carry out the threat
was unnecessary, the Magleby court quoted from the intimidation
definition that required the specific intent to place the victim in
fear. Both courts extrapolated their respective definition of true
threats from these different parts of the Black definition. 181
C. The Ninth Circuit: A Locus for (and Microcosm of) Controversy

By this point, it seems cliche to use the Ninth Circuit as the premier example of the judicial split over the proper intent standard
for true threats. Remember, it was the Ninth Circuit that produced
both Roy (the foundational opinion for the reasonable speaker
test)1 82 and Twine (the lone pre-Black opinion to adopt Justice
Marshall's specific intent to threaten standard);183 the Ninth Circuit
was also home to the sharply contested Planned Parenthood decision, which produced majority and dissenting opinions with starkly
different approaches to the intent question. 184 Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit's response to Black epitomizes the ambiguity of the

180

United States v. Magleby, 420 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting and citing
Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60) (internal citations omitted); see also supra notes 8-9 and
accompanying text.
181
See id. at 1139; United States v. Bly, No. CRIM. 3:04CR00011, 2005 WL 2621996,
at *2 (W.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2005); see also Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60.
182
Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969); see supra notes 53-56, 81-88
and accompanying text.
183
United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1988); see supra notes 44-46, 73-77
and accompanying text.
184
Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002); see supra notes 106-20 and accompanying
text.
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Court's attempted definition and demonstrates how this lack of
clarity continues to trouble the jurisprudence.
In United States v. Lincoln, the Ninth Circuit applied its deeplyrooted reasonable speaker test in a prosecution for a threat made
against the President. 185 Like some of the courts mentioned above,
the court in Lincoln did not refer to the Black decision when discussing the meaning of "true threats. " 186 Instead, it applied an objective intent standard and held that the letter in question did not
constitute a true threat. 187 Interestingly, the author of the Lincoln
opinion was Judge Rawlinson. She was the only judge on the panel
who participated in the Planned Parenthood en bane decision. In
that case, she joined the majority opinion, which adopted an objective intent approach. 188
The Ninth Circuit panel that decided United States v. Cassel also
had a single alumnus from the Planned Parenthood decision, Judge
O'Scannlain. 189 Unlike Judge Rawlinson, Judge O'Scannlain dissented in Planned Parenthood. 190 Filed less than two months after
Lincoln, the Cassel opinion, written by Judge O'Scannlain, adopted
an entirely new approach to the meaning of true threats. After acknowledging that true threats are unprotected by the First
Amendment, the court made the following observations:
We are ... faced with the question whether intent to threaten the
victim is required in order for speech to fall within the First
Amendment exception for threats .... [T]he disputed question is
whether the government must prove that the defendant intended
his words or conduct to be understood by the victim as a threat.
[Defendant] argues that it must. The government's position is
that mere negligence with regard to the victim's understanding is
enough: in other words, speech is punishable if a reasonable person would understand it as a threat, whether or not the speaker
meant for it to be so understood. 191
185
403 F.3d 703, 706 (9th Cir. 2005) (relying on United States v. Hanna, 293 F.3d
1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 2002)).
186
The court did mention Watts, however. Id. at 706--07.
187
Id. at 706--08.
188
Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1062.
189
United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 624 (9th Cir. 2005).
190
Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1089, 1101.
191
Cassel, 408 F.3d at 627-28.
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Thus, the court signaled its intention to address the constitutional
issue which has consumed this Note-a question the Ninth Circuit
evaded when it first decided the issue in Roy. 1<n
Although it recognized that, with the exception of Twine and its
progeny, the Ninth Circuit had traditionally applied the reasonable
speaker test, the Cassel panel asserted that Black was now the
guiding precedent. After quoting Black's definition of true threats
and intimidation, the panel interpreted the Court's language to
mean that "only intentional threats are criminally punishable consistently with the First Amendment. ... A natural reading of [the
Court's] language embraces not only the requirement that the
communication itself be intentional, but also the requirement that
the speaker intend for his language to threaten the victim." 193 Noting that the "Court laid great weight on the intent requirement" in
Black, the Cassel panel held that it must "conclude that the same
principle governs in the case before us. " 194 Recognizing that the
adoption of a specific intent to threaten subjective test conflicted
with some of the circuit's previous decisions, the court simply observed that the Supreme Court's "definition of a constitutionally
proscribable threat is, of course, binding," and therefore the court
was "bound to conclude that speech may be deemed unprotected
by the First Amendment as a 'true threat' only upon proof that the
speaker subjectively intended the speech as a threat." 195
In a span of forty-five days (the length of time between the Lincoln and Cassel decisions), the Ninth Circuit had seemingly made a

192

See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
Cassel, 408 F.3d at 631 ("The Court's insistence on intent to threaten as the sine
qua non of a constitutionally punishable threat is especially clear from its ultimate
holding that the Virginia statute was unconstitutional precisely because the element
of intent was effectively eliminated by the statute's provision rendering any burning
of a cross on the property of another prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate.")
(internal quotations omitted).
194
Id. at 631-33.
195
Id. at 633. The court attempted to reconcile its holding with the Lincoln decision,
which was decided only weeks earlier, in a footnote: "Because Lincoln merely applied
longstanding precedent and did not raise or consider the implications of Virginia v.
Black, it does not constrain our analysis in this case." Id. at 633 n.9. Similarly, the
court reconciled its opinion with some of those discussed earlier, which held that
Black affirmed the use of an objective test, by stating that "it appears that no other
circuit has squarely addressed the question whether Black requires the government to
prove the defendant's intent." Id. at 633 n.10 (emphasis added).
193
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180-degree turn on the issue of intent. Forty-two days later, the
Ninth Circuit made another about-face. In United States v. Romo, a
case involving a conviction for threats made against the President,
the court revisited the meaning of true threats. 196 Instead of applying the specific intent standard seemingly required by Cassel, the
court applied its familiar reasonable speaker objective test and explained the limited reach of Cassel in a footnote:
The recent decision in United States v. Cassel does not change
our view. Cassel leaves untouched the reasonable person analysis
for presidential threats because it did not address whether statutes like 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) require intent. Because [the defendant] has not raised First Amendment issues and Cassel does not
alter the analysis of presidential threats, we employ the decadesold [Roy] approach to analyzing threats under 18 U.S.C.
§ 87l(a).191
But the Ninth Circuit did not rest with its decision in Romo. In
United States v. Stewart, a case heard by the same panel which decided Cassel, the court attempted to reconcile the circuit's most recent true threat opinions. 198 The defendant was convicted for making a threat against a federal judge, and one of the issues before the
court was whether his speech was constitutionally protected. 199 The
court compared the contradictory holdings in Cassel and Romo
and, as would be expected given the panel's membership, had
doubts about "Roma's continued use of the objective 'true threat'
definition" in light of "Black's subjective 'true threat' definition." 200
Instead of resolving the conflicting approaches, the court took a
page from the Supreme Court's playbook and punted: "Nonetheless, we need not decide whether the objective or subjective 'true
threat' definition should apply here. That is because the evidence
establishes that [the defendant's] statement was a 'true threat' under either definition and thus is not protected by the First

196

413 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2005). This panel had no members from the en bane
Planned Parenthood decision.
197
Id. at 1051 n.6 (internal citations omitted).
198
420 F.3d 1007, 1016-19 (9th Cir. 2005).
199 Id.
200
Id. at 1018.

2006]

"True Threats" and the Issue of Intent

1269

Amendment." 201 Put simply, the court threw up its hands and declared, at least temporarily, an intra-circuit truce.
V.

WHAT SHOULD THE INTENT STANDARD BE?:
A NORMATIVE ANALYSIS

As evidenced by the back-and-forth of the Ninth Circuit, there is
still a need, even after Black, for a clear and consistent approach to
the intent standard of true threats. While the best interpretation of
Black seems to be that the specific intent to threaten is required for
all true threats, not just intimidation, the Court's inability to clearly
articulate an intent standard has allowed a potpourri of mens rea
approaches to persist in the lower courts. 202 Regardless of what the
Court's aims in Black truly were, the disparate treatments (and interpretations) by the lower courts indicate that the Court must revisit the meaning of true threats, and the question of intent, sometime soon. When that time arrives, what intent standard should the
Court adopt? This Part will examine the normative arguments of
each approach and argue that for all true threats the Court should
require the same subjective intent standard it adopted for intimidation-the specific intent to threaten the recipient or victim.
True threats, like any of the "Chaplinsky exceptions" to the First
Amendment, should be defined with both the values underlying
free speech and the reasons for proscribing the category in mind.
This much is not controversial. As the Court noted in Black, "[t]he
hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow 'free trade in
ideas'-even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might
find distasteful or discomforting." 203 These principles must be balId.
Some commentators have been even more critical of the Court's failure to clearly
define the meaning of true threats. For example, in a sharp critique, Professor Gey
states that "we have no way of knowing exactly what Black portends for free speech
because (to put the matter unkindly) Justice O'Connor's opinion in the cross burning
case borders on the incoherent. The Court sends several different messages about free
speech in Black, many of which contradict each other." Gey, A Few Questions, supra
note 3, at 1287-88; see also Martin, supra note 10, at 290-91 ("Unfortunately, the
Court [in Black] did not delineate the border between true threats and protected
speech ... [and thus] avoided the precarious task of defining the outer reaches of the
true threats doctrine.").
203
Black, 538 U.S. at 358; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
201

202
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anced against the motives for prohibiting threatening speech: "protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption
that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened
violence will occur. " 204 It was an attempt to achieve such a balance
that originally animated the conception of the term "true
threats." 205 For reasons that will be elaborated further, the subjective test that requires the specific intent to threaten achieves the
optimal balance.
Since the Ninth Circuit's 1969 decision in Roy, the objective intent test has been the prevailing standard. 206 In United States v.
Kosma, the Third Circuit provided a particularly thorough, and
fairly representative, justification for the objective intent approach
to true threats. "[M]indful of the potential difficulties in distinguishing between constitutionally protected political speech and
unprotected threats," 207 the court offered two generally accepted
reasons for why the objective intent approach is superior. First, the
objective intent test "best satisfies the purposes" of punishing
threatening speech "since it recognizes the power of a threat to
hinder ... even when the threatmaker has no intention of carrying
itself offensive or disagreeable."); see generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964) (extolling the importance of protecting speech even if it contains factual
errors or defamatory content because of the need for promoting vigorous and open
debate in public discourse).
204
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992); see also Black, 538 U.S. at
360; supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
205
See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (noting that "we must interpret the language Congress chose against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials" and that political language "is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact") (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
206
See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
207
United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 553 (3d Cir. 1991). While Kosma deals with
a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 871 for threats made against the President, and thus
its rationales are tailored to such a prosecution, its reasoning for the superiority of an
objective intent approach is consistent with the justifications courts and commentators give for objective intent tests generally, regardless of who the victim or recipient
of the alleged threat is. Furthermore, as noted earlier, with the exception of the Ninth
Circuit, every circuit that has adopted an objective intent approach has applied that
standard across-the-board to all contexts of threatening statements. See supra note 75.
Because this author agrees that the same intent standard should be used for all true
threats, the respective merits of the objective and subjective intent approaches will be
analyzed regardless of whether the victim is the President or a private person.
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out the threat and there is no actual danger." 208 Because "[t]he
threat alone is disruptive of the recipient's sense of personal safety
and well-being," the court argued that one subjective intent standard, the specific intent to carry out the threat test, was inappropriate. 209
Having dismissed the requirement of a specific intent to carry
out the threat, the court in Kosma addressed the second subjective
standard, the specific intent to threaten test, and supplied another
popular reason for preferring an objective intent approach. The
court considered and rejected the specific intent to threaten standard, first articulated by Justice Marshall in Rogers, because this
"subjective test makes it considerably more difficult for the government to prosecute threats." 210 Moreover, "any subjective test
potentially frustrates the purposes" of preventing true threats because it "make[s] prosecution of these threats significantly more
difficult." 211 Thus, according to Kosma and other objective intent
opinions, the specific intent to threaten should not be required.
Supporters of an objective intent standard correctly reject the
subjective test which requires the defendant to have intended to
carry out the threat. As noted in Kosma, such a standard ignores
the harms associated with threatening speech, such as fear and disruption. The speaker need not intend to carry out his threat in order for his words to have a deleterious effect. Put simply, threats
are not, and should not, be considered inchoate crimes. Thus, most
courts, including the Supreme Court, have rightly held that "[t]he
speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat" in order
for the communication to constitute a true threat. 212
When it comes to the specific intent to threaten subjective test,
however, the majority of courts have missed the mark. Although

208

Kosma, 951 F.2d. at 557.
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original); see also United States v.
Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that the objective standard best accomplishes the aim of preserving the recipient's sense of personal safety).
21
°Kosma, 951 F.2d at 556-58 (citing Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 48 (1975)
(Marshall, J., concurring)).
211
Id. at 558. As one commentator stated, concurring with this justification for rejecting the specific intent to threaten, "a subjective speaker-based test could overburden prosecutors by requiring an extremely high standard of proof." Strauss, supra
note 10, at 263-64.
212
Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60.
20

'
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an objective test secures the purposes of regulating threats, it does
not properly balance those concerns with the values of the First
Amendment. In fact, the foundational opinion for the reasonable
speaker test, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Roy, did not even consider the First Amendment implications of its interpretation.213 Because it undervalues the tenet that language which is "vituperative,
abusive, and inexact" may still be protected under the First
Amendment,214 the objective intent standard, in each of its forms, is
over-inclusive when it comes to prohibiting threatening speech. By
focusing on how a reasonable person may react, the objective approach severely discounts the speaker's general First Amendment
right to communicate freely, even if that means using language
which a reasonable person might find disagreeable. The Court
clearly stated this principle in Black when it opined, "[t]he hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow 'free trade in
ideas'-even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might
find distasteful or discomforting." 215 By ignoring the intent of the
speaker, an objective test runs the risk of punishing crudely worded
ideas; conversely, a subjective test provides a better line of demarcation between ideas and threats. If the speaker did not intend for
his communication to be threatening, it is much more likely that he
intended to communicate an idea, even if he did so using what a
reasonable person would consider abrasive or offensive language.
As Justice Marshall explained in his concurrence in Rogers, "[i]n
essence, the objective interpretation embodies a negligence standard, charging the defendant with responsibility for the effect of his
statements on his listeners ..... [W]e should be particularly wary of
adopting such a standard for a statute that regulates pure speech"
because it "would have substantial costs in discouraging the uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate that the First Amendment is
intended to protect." 216 Because an objective test makes the intent
of the speaker irrelevant, a speaker who does not intend for his
communication to be threatening, but fears that some may interpret it as so, will not engage in such expression. Consequently,
213

See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
Black, 538 U.S. at 358.
216
Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 47-48 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
21

•

215
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speakers who do not intend for their speech to be threatening will
still censor themselves, fearful that a reasonable person may construe the communication as threatening. Put simply, an objective
standard chills speech.
Like an objective intent standard, Justice Marshall's subjective
test protects against the harms caused by threatening speech.
Unlike the objective intent approach, however, it properly balances this goal against the values of free expression. Instead of
simply prohibiting speech based on the reaction it incurs, this subjective intent standard punishes the speaker who intends to create
the harms of threatening speech, be it fear, disruption, or the threat
of violence. Under the First Amendment, this is a much better approach. By requiring a specific intent to threaten, a speaker who
wishes to bring about the harms associated with threatening speech
will be punished; at the same time, the speaker who had no such intention will be given the necessary "breathing space" to speak
freely and openly.
There are two common and related criticisms to this subjective
intent approach. First, objective intent proponents, such as the
court in Kosma, claim that a subjective intent test will increase the
prosecutor's burden. This, however, is not a legitimate reason for
rejecting a subjective standard. If anything, the burden on the
prosecutor should be heightened when the regulation of pure
speech is involved. Furthermore, the purpose of criminalizing any
form of conduct, including speech, is not to ease the prosecutor's
burden but to prohibit conduct society finds worthy of punishment.
Second, critics of the specific intent to threaten standard have
argued that such an approach should not be adopted because it
"would allow carefully crafted statements by speakers who actually
intend to threaten to go unpunished. "217 Even if this were true, such
criticism does not merit the rejection of this subjective intent test.
In the vast majority of cases, if a statement seems clearly threatening, it will be difficult for the defendant to plausibly explain how
his communication was not intended to be threatening. For instance, in United States v. Bly, the defendant sent several threatening letters and emails to University of Virginia employees follow-

211

Strauss, supra note 10, at 263.
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ing his termination from a graduate program. One such communication said the following:
It would be a damn shame if the only way I could obtain justice

in this element of class warfare is to kill Dr. Rydin. This is not
venting. I promise you, this is DEADLY SERIOUS. Please get
your ass in gear so I am not left with retribution, retaliation, and
vigilante justice as the only justice available to me. NO
JOKE .... Remember my belief in bullets as the ultimate backup
for futile dialogue. 218
In cases such as this, any attempt by the defendant to explain the
intent of his communication as non-threatening would most likely
be laughable and unbelievable. Only in cases at the proverbial
margin, where the line between protected idea and punishable
threat is more thinly sliced, will the application of the specific intent to threaten standard potentially lead to a different outcome
than if an objective test were applied.
For example, in United States v. Rogers, the case in which Justice
Marshall introduced the specific intent to threaten standard in a
concurring opinion (the Court reversed the conviction on other
grounds), the defendant was prosecuted for making threats against
President Nixon. After walking into a coffee shop, the defendant
"accosted several customers and waitresses, telling them, among
other things, that he was Jesus Christ and that he was opposed to
President Nixon's visiting China because the Chinese had a bomb
that only he knew about, which might be used against the people of
this country." 219 During these outbursts, the defendant "announced
that he was going to go to Washington to 'whip Nixon's ass,' or to
'kill him in order to save the United States."' 220 After local police
were notified of the disturbance and threatening remarks, the defendant was questioned about his behavior. Asked if he had threatened the President, the defendant "replied that he didn't like the
idea of the President's going to China and making friends with the
Chinese." He then said, "'I'm going to Washington and I'm going

218
United States v. Bly, No. CRIM. 3:04CR00011, 2005 WL 2621996, at *l n.1 (W.D.
Va. Oct. 14, 2005) (alteration in original).
219
Rogers, 422 U.S. at 41-42 (Marshall, J., concurring).
220
Id. at 42.
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to beat his ass off. Better yet, I will go kill him.'" 221 Rogers was
prosecuted for making threatening statements against the President and was later convicted after a jury trial; the circuit court affirmed the conviction. At his trial, the judge instructed the jury that
it should convict if the reasonable speaker objective test was met. 222
It is hard to know whether Rogers would still have been convicted if the specific intent to threaten subjective test was used instead of the reasonable speaker standard. However, it seems at
least plausible that given the context of his threatening statements
(his disapproval of President Nixon's visit to China), his remarks
were nothing more than crude political statements of the sort that
were protected in Watts. However, it is also possible that he actually intended to threaten the President. The point is that an objective intent test fails to distinguish between these two situations,
rendering the speaker's actual intent immaterial. All that matters
under an objective standard is whether a reasonable person would
have construed the statement as threatening. Conversely, the specific intent to threaten standard inquires into the speaker's motive,
distinguishing between these two possible explanations of the
speaker's intent.
It must be emphasized that the use of a subjective intent test
does not mean the defendant will automatically go free; instead, it
will simply permit the speaker an opportunity to explain his statement-an explanation that may shed light on the question of
whether this communication was articulating an idea or expressing
a threat. 223
Id.
Id. at 43-44 ("[T]he jury was permitted to convict on a showing merely that a reasonable man in petitioner's place would have foreseen that the statements he made
would be understood as indicating a serious intention to commit the act.").
223
Another way the use of a subjective intent standard could potentially lead to a
different result than an objective intent test is that defenses based on mental incompetence (or voluntary intoxication) would be permissible. For instance, in United States
v. Richards, 415 F. Supp. 2d. 547, 551 (E.D. Pa. 2005), a defendant with "evident"
mental health problems was prosecuted for making threatening statements against an
immediate family member of a former President (former First Lady and current Senator Hillary Clinton). In line for dinner at a homeless shelter, the defendant said, apparently to no one in particular but loud enough for most in the room to hear, "I'm
gonna [sic] put two bullets in her, gonna [sic] put two bullets into Hillary Clinton." Id.
at 549. The defendant was later involuntarily committed to a mental health clinic.
However, as the court implicitly recognized, a defense based on mental defect would
221

222
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Any time the government must prove a specific intent element,
society runs the risk of its craftiest criminals escaping conviction.
This risk does not mean, however, that we should limit our mens
rea options to general intent (negligence and recklessness, for example). Instead, the legal system, as it always does, must rely on
the jury (or judge in a bench trial) to make judgments as to
whether the defendant is telling the truth about his intent. By requiring a subjective intent, the government can still secure a conviction for blatant threats. The only significant difference is that
under a subjective test, the defendant can legitimately argue that
he did not mean to threaten the recipient; under an objective test,
he is limited to arguing how a reasonable person should have understood his communication. When pure speech is punished, the
speaker's intent should matter. 224 Moreover, the results in the easy
cases would not change. As even the court in Kosma admitted, the
adoption of a "subjective 'knowingly' standard would probably not
open the floodgates to threats" going unpunished. 225 The only area
that would likely see a difference is at the edge. In those close-call
situations, however, it is much better to let the "crafty criminal" go
free than to imprison the innocent speaker whose words unintentionally seemed threatening to a "reasonable person." Otherwise,
speech, especially at the fringe, will be unnecessarily chilled. 226

only be permissible under a subjective intent test. Id. at 551; see also supra notes 4447 and accompanying text.
"'The First Amendment's incitement exception provides an apt analogy. In that
context, the Court has held that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasis added). Brandenburg was decided less than
two months after Watts.
225
United States v. Kosma, 951F.2d549, 558 (3d Cir. 1991).
226
The Court has taken a similar approach when it comes to the First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine. Fearful that overbroad statutes would inappropriately chill
speech, the Court has allowed defendants, whose conduct is not necessarily constitutionally protected, to make facial challenges to statutes which may chill the speech of
others, even if not their own. In effect, the Court has let the "uncrafty criminal" go
free in order to secure sufficient free speech protection for others whose speech may
be chilled as a result of an otherwise permissible prosecution. For a discussion of the
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The Federal System 184-99 (5th ed. 2003).
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Instead of letting the reasonable person decide what constitutes
a true threat, only those speakers who intended for their communication to be threatening should be punished for their speech. As
the Court famously explained, "we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running
a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." 221 A speaker
should not become a criminal simply because of the effect of his
words; only when the speaker has the specific intent to threaten
should he be punished for making a true threat.
CONCLUSION

For now, the Black opinion has had a limited influence on the
jurisprudence of true threats and the issue of intent. After quoting
the definition provided in Black, the district court in United States
v. Carmichael explained that "[t]he Supreme Court has not settled
on a definition of a 'true threat."' 228 If anything, the Black decision
further muddied the area by suggesting, at least to some, that the
specific intent to threaten was constitutionally required-a requirement that enjoyed little support in the jurisprudence before
April 2003.
At this point, only two things seem clear. First, absent a stronger
statement from the Court in support of a subjective standard, the
objective intent approach will continue to reign supreme. This, unfortunately, means speech will continue to be chilled in the name
of precedent and prosecutorial burden. Second, given the range of
reactions to Black, the Court will have to revisit the meaning of
true threats and the issue of intent. When it does, we can only hope
it is more successful at clearly defining the doctrine than it has
been in the past. Until then, it will be fourth down and goal to go.

221

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (applying the reasonable neutral test for the meaning of true threats).
228
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